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An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict

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  • Daniel G. Arce M.
  • Todd Sandler

Abstract

This paper investigates the evolutionary equilibria of a clash of cultures game where conflict results from failures to share social power in individual pairings. Members of a general subpopulation are matched with those of a fundamentalist subpopulation, the latter being more cohesive and insistent that their identity traits define the norms for, and outcomes of, social, economic, and political interaction. Simulations of the evolutionary dynamics reveal a tradeoff between the intolerance of fundamentalism and the likelihood of a takeover. This tradeoff is reversed if fundamentalism is falsifiable: affording non-fundamentalists the ability to signal fundamentalist traits produces a bandwagon effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, 2003. "An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 132-132, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200303)159:1_132:aegatf_2.0.tx_2-a
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Friedrich Schneider & Tilman Brück & Daniel Meierrieks, 2010. "The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part I)," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1049, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Gil Epstein & Ira Gang, 2007. "Understanding the development of fundamentalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 257-271, September.
    3. Sriya Iyer, 2016. "The New Economics of Religion," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 395-441, June.
    4. Correani, Luca & Di Dio, Fabio & Garofalo, Giuseppe, 2009. "The evolutionary dynamics of tolerance," MPRA Paper 18989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, April.
    6. Guth, Werner & Pull, Kerstin, 2004. "Will equity evolve?: an indirect evolutionary approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 273-282, March.
    7. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, 2005. "Measuring terrorism," Chapters,in: Law and the State, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Charles Anderton, 2014. "The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Papers 1407, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    9. Charles H. Anderton, 2015. "The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 5-20, October.
    10. Koch Michael & Tkach Benjamin, 2012. "Deterring or Mobilizing? The Influence of Government Partisanship and Force on the Frequency, Lethality and Suicide Attacks of Terror Events," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-29, August.
    11. Arce, Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2009. "Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 739-757, September.
    12. Friedman, Daniel. & Fan, Jijian. & Jonathan Gair & Sriya Iyer & Bartosz Redlicki & Chander Velu, 2016. "How Fundamentalism Takes Root: A Simulation Study," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1681, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    13. Todd Sandler & Håvard Hegre, 2002. "Economic analysis of civil wars," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(6), pages 429-433.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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