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The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory

Author

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  • Charles Anderton

    (Department of Economics and Accounting, College of the Holy Cross)

Abstract

This article uses evolutionary game theory to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by terrorist organizations and genocide architects. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, entrepreneurs of violence can create the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people group into one that supports or does not resist violence against an out-group. The model is extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in Moore and von Neumann neighborhoods. The model also reveals policy interventions in which the social evolution of aggression never gets started or comes to a halt if already underway.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Anderton, 2014. "The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Papers 1407, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hcx:wpaper:1407
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    File URL: http://web.holycross.edu/RePEc/hcx/HC1407-Anderton_EvolutionofGenocide.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sebastian Ille, 2014. "The Dynamics Of Norms And Conventions Under Local Interactions And Imitation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(03), pages 1-23.
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    4. Arce, Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2009. "Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 739-757, September.
    5. Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
    6. Charles Anderton, 2010. "Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives On The Disturbing Rationality Of Race Murder," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(5-6), pages 459-486.
    7. Matthew O. Jackson, 2014. "Networks in the Understanding of Economic Behaviors," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 3-22, Fall.
    8. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2010. "Network Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 218-244.
    9. Charles H. Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2021. "Mass Atrocities and Their Prevention," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1240-1292, December.
    10. Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, 2003. "An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 132-154, March.
    11. Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley (ed.), 2003. "The Economics of Conflict," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 2497, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terrorism; Terrorism; Genocide; Game Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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