How Fundamentalism Takes Root: A Simulation Study
We report agent-based simulations of religiosity dynamics in a spatially dispersed population. Agents' religiosity responds to neighbours via pairwise interactions as well as via club goods effects. A simulation run is deemed fundamentalist if the final distribution contains a sizable minority of very high religiosity together with a majority of lesser religiosity. Such simulations are more prevalent when parameter values shift from values reflecting traditional societies towards values reflecting the modern world. The simulations suggest that the rise of fundamentalism in the modern world is boosted by greater real income, lower relative prices for secular goods, less substitutability between religious and secular goods, and less time spent with neighbours. Surprisingly, the simulations suggest little role for the rise of long distance communication and transportation.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2012. "Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and Cooperation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 121-151, August.
- McBride, Michael, 2015.
"Why churches need free-riders: Religious capital formation and religious group survival,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics),
Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 77-87.
- Michael McBride, 2007. "Why Churches Need Free-riders: Religious Capital Formation and Religious Group Survival," Working Papers 060722, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Michael D. Makowsky, 2012. "Emergent Extremism In A Multi‐Agent Model Of Religious Clubs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 327-347, 04.
- Arce, Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2009. "Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 739-757, September.
- Makowsky, Michael D., 2011. "Religion, clubs, and emergent social divides," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 74-87.
- Michael D. Makowsky, 2009. "Religion, Clubs, and Emergent Social Divides," Working Papers 2009-03, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised May 2010.
- Makowsky, Michael, 2009. "Religion, Clubs, and Emergent Social Divides," MPRA Paper 14359, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shy, Oz, 2007. "Dynamic models of religious conformity and conversion: Theory and calibrations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 1127-1153, July.
- Oz Shy, 2005. "Dynamic Models of Religious Conformity and Conversion: Theory and Calibrations," CIG Working Papers SP II 2005-12, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-291, April.
- Gil Epstein & Ira Gang, 2007. "Understanding the development of fundamentalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 257-271, September.
- Ira N. Gang & Gil S. Epstein, 2002. "Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism," Departmental Working Papers 200222, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Gang, Ira N. & Epstein, Gil S., 2004. "Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism," IZA Discussion Papers 1227, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Eli Berman, 2000. "Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 905-953.
- Eli Berman, 1998. "Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews," NBER Working Papers 6715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel L. Chen, 2010. "Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence during the Indonesian Financial Crisis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 300-354, 04.
- Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, 2003. "An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 132-132, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1681. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Dyer)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.