The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory
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- Charles Anderton, 2014. "The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Papers 1407, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Charles H. Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2019. "Mass Atrocities and their Prevention," Working Papers 1901, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
- Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
- Charles Anderton, 2010.
"Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives On The Disturbing Rationality Of Race Murder,"
Defence and Peace Economics,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(5-6), pages 459-486.
- Charles Anderton, 2010. "Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives On The Disturbing Rationality Of Race Murder," Working Papers 1006, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2014. "Networks in the Understanding of Economic Behaviors," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 3-22, Fall.
- Kaivan Munshi, 2014. "Community Networks and the Process of Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 49-76, Fall.
- Philip Verwimp, 2011. "The 1990-1992 Massacres in Rwanda: A Case of Spatial and Social Engineering?," HiCN Working Papers 94, Households in Conflict Network.
- Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2010. "Network Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 218-244.
- Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, 2003. "An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 132-154, March.
- Arce, Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2009. "Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 739-757, September.
- repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:16:y:2014:i:03:n:s0219198914500017 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsGenocide; social evolution; peacekeeping; aggression; Holocaust;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
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