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Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives On The Disturbing Rationality Of Race Murder

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  • Charles Anderton

    (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

Abstract

An economic theory of genocide is presented with application to Rwanda-1994. The theory considers 'macro' conditions under which an authority group chooses genocide and 'micro' conditions that facilitate the spread of genocide. From the macro perspective, a bargaining model highlights four rational explanations for an authority's choice of genocide: prevention of loss of power, indivisibility, elimination of a persistent rival, and political bias. From the micro perspective, an evolutionary game model shows how supporters of genocide gain the upper hand in group dynamics over resisters and bystanders. The theory and application suggest that the conditions for genocide are not exceptional.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Anderton, 2010. "Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives On The Disturbing Rationality Of Race Murder," Working Papers 1006, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hcx:wpaper:1006
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    File URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2010.513478
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1.
    2. Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley (ed.), 2003. "The Economics of Conflict," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 2497.
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles H. Anderton, 2015. "The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 5-20, October.
    2. Mushed, Syed Mansoob & Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan, 2015. "Political economy of the Indonesian mass killing of 1965-1966," MPRA Paper 64878, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036, October.
    4. Anderton Charles H., 2014. "Killing Civilians as an Inferior Input in a Rational Choice Model of Genocide and Mass Killing," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 327-346, April.
    5. Rusch, Hannes, 2023. "The logic of human intergroup conflict:," Research Memorandum 014, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    6. Charles Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2014. "Economics of Genocide and International Law," Working Papers 1409, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Genocide; Conflict; Bargaining; Game Theory; Rwanda;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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