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Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism

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  • Arce, Daniel G.
  • Sandler, Todd

Abstract

We provide an evolutionary model of conflict based on dyadic interactions within and between individuals drawn from a society containing fundamentalists and "others." Thus, the paper presents an asymmetric game representation of group effects. Fundamentalist control of society is inversely related to the degree of social stratification, and fundamentalists' intolerance of others. If, however, fundamentalism can be feigned (by displaying certain traits), then fundamentalists must balance their intolerance and insularity to take power. The model provides a novel means for distinguishing democratic versus open societies. This leads to a central result characterizing how fair and open societies can peacefully contravene fundamentalism.

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  • Arce, Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2009. "Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 739-757, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:31:y:2009:i:5:p:739-757
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    1. Charles H. Anderton, 2015. "The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 5-20, October.
    2. Sriya Iyer, 2016. "The New Economics of Religion," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 395-441, June.
    3. Correani, Luca & Di Dio, Fabio & Garofalo, Giuseppe, 2009. "The evolutionary dynamics of tolerance," MPRA Paper 18989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036, January.
    5. Friedman, Daniel. & Fan, Jijian. & Jonathan Gair & Sriya Iyer & Bartosz Redlicki & Chander Velu, 2016. "How Fundamentalism Takes Root: A Simulation Study," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1681, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Elu Juliet U. & Price Gregory N., 2012. "Remittances and the Financing of Terrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: 1974 - 2006," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-42, July.
    7. Fan, Jijian & Friedman, Daniel & Gair, Jonathan & Iyer, Sriya & Redlicki, Bartosz & Velu, Chander, 2021. "A simulation study of how religious fundamentalism takes root," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 465-481.

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