Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 1998. "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," ISU General Staff Papers 199804010800001308, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Kuran, Timur, 1991. "The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising That We Were Surprised?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 121-125, May.
- Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, October.
- G. Daniel & M. Arce & Todd Sandler, 2005. "The Dilemma of the Prisoners’ Dilemmas," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 3-24, February.
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
- Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 2000. "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1823, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Hansen, Robert G. & Samuelson, William F., 1988. "Evolution in economic games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 315-338, October.
- Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, September.
- Gil Epstein & Ira Gang, 2007.
"Understanding the development of fundamentalism,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 257-271, September.
- Ira N. Gang & Gil S. Epstein, 2002. "Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism," Departmental Working Papers 200222, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Gang, Ira N. & Epstein, Gil S., 2004. "Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism," IZA Discussion Papers 1227, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1999. "The bioeconomic causes of war," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(7-8), pages 457-466.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-921, September.
- Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, 2003. "An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 132-154, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Correani, Luca & Di Dio, Fabio & Garofalo, Giuseppe, 2009. "The evolutionary dynamics of tolerance," MPRA Paper 18989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Elu Juliet U. & Price Gregory N., 2012. "Remittances and the Financing of Terrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: 1974 - 2006," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-42, July.
- Sriya Iyer, 2016. "The New Economics of Religion," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 395-441, June.
- Friedman, D. & Fan, J. & Gair, J. & Iyer, S. & Redlicki, B. & Velu, C., 2020. "A Simulation Study of How Religious Fundamentalism Takes Root," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2089, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Charles H. Anderton, 2015.
"The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory,"
Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 5-20, October.
- Charles Anderton, 2014. "The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Papers 1407, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
- Friedman, Daniel. & Fan, Jijian. & Jonathan Gair & Sriya Iyer & Bartosz Redlicki & Chander Velu, 2016. "How Fundamentalism Takes Root: A Simulation Study," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1681, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
More about this item
KeywordsEvolution games Fundamentalism Assortative matching Nonassortative matching Social control Terrorism Asymmetric game Open society;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:31:y:2009:i:5:p:739-757. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Haili He). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505735 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.