Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism
We provide an evolutionary model of conflict based on dyadic interactions within and between individuals drawn from a society containing fundamentalists and "others." Thus, the paper presents an asymmetric game representation of group effects. Fundamentalist control of society is inversely related to the degree of social stratification, and fundamentalists' intolerance of others. If, however, fundamentalism can be feigned (by displaying certain traits), then fundamentalists must balance their intolerance and insularity to take power. The model provides a novel means for distinguishing democratic versus open societies. This leads to a central result characterizing how fair and open societies can peacefully contravene fundamentalism.
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