Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences
Governments fighting terrorists have many tactical options, yet these options often yield unintended and counterproductive consequences. This paper models a terrorist organization, a religious group from which the terrorists recruit suicide bombers, and the society in which the terrorists are embedded. The model illuminates how the choice of anti-insurgent tactics influences the incidence of attacks, paying particular attention to the direct and indirect (unintended) consequences of the government's actions. The ultimate goal of this work is to identify the best way to stop terrorist attacks
|Date of creation:||Dec 2010|
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|Publication status:||published as Michael McBride & Gary Richardson, 2012. "Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 413-429, October.|
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