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Terrorist training: Onsite or via the Internet?

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  • Siqueira, Kevin
  • Arce, Daniel

Abstract

This paper investigates an agency model of a terrorist organization in which the training and motivation of recruits can occur onsite, in physical training camps, or at arm’s length through the Internet. In so doing, we develop measures of the effectiveness and efficacy of these recruit training methods. A dividing line for choosing between the two is characterized in terms of the degree to which onsite training augments an operative’s probability of mission success. In comparing our results to data on terror-tactic lethality, one implication is that terrorist organizations are likely to consider Internet training as sufficient for any tactic that is less complex and less lethal than vehicular assaults, and will require onsite motivation and training for more complex missions such as multiple-operative mass shootings and suicide bombings.

Suggested Citation

  • Siqueira, Kevin & Arce, Daniel, 2020. "Terrorist training: Onsite or via the Internet?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300264
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101878
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin Gassebner & Richard Jong‐A‐Pin & Jochen O. Mierau, 2011. "Terrorism And Cabinet Duration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1253-1270, November.
    2. Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 676-686, August.
    3. Michael McBride & Gary Richardson, 2012. "Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 413-429, October.
    4. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
    5. Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 1998. "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," ISU General Staff Papers 199804010800001308, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    6. Mario Ferrero, 2006. "Martyrdom Contracts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(6), pages 855-877, December.
    7. Daniel G. Arce, 2019. "On the human consequences of terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(3), pages 371-396, March.
    8. Daniel G Arce & Kevin Siqueira, 2014. "Motivating operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(4), pages 677-695, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terrorism; Incentives; Training and motivation; Counterterrorism;

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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