Community Preferences, Insurgency, and the Success of Reconstruction Spending
A model of reconstruction spending by an occupying force is developed, in which the local population may have different preferences over the allocation of spending than the occupier. When the spending allocation is misaligned with local preferences an insurgency among some members of the community may result. Depending on the effectiveness of the insurgency, local opposition may constrain the ability of the occupier to implement its most preferred spending allocation. In equilibrium, the occupier may tolerate some level of insurgency to approach its ideal, but naive insistence on a most preferred allocation may lead to fewer projects of any kind being completed. The model suggests that winning the hearts and minds of a local population is less a question of how much money is invested in reconstruction than of how that money is allocated across projects of different kinds.
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://web.uvic.ca/econ
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benjamin Crost & Joseph Felter & Patrick Johnston, 2014. "Aid under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1833-56, June.
- Eli Berman & Jacob N. Shapiro & Joseph H. Felter, 2011.
"Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(4), pages 766 - 819.
- Eli Berman & Jacob N. Shapiro & Joseph H. Felter, 2008. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," NBER Working Papers 14606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Berman, Eli & Laitin, David D., 2008.
"Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1942-1967, October.
- Eli Berman & David D. Laitin, 2008. "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model," NBER Working Papers 13725, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eli Berman & David Laitin, 2005. "Hard Targets: Theory and Evidence on Suicide Attacks," NBER Working Papers 11740, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:1202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Giles)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.