Terror Support And Recruitment
We analyse a dynamic model linking terrorist activities to popular support through a recruitment mechanism. It is shown that anti-terrorism policies focusing on liberal ideals (reducing repression, increasing economic opportunity) are effective at abating recruitment, thereby affecting the dynamic stability of terrorist attacks. In contrast, deterrence's comparative advantage is in counteracting hard-core members, implying that terror eradication itself requires an emphasis on hard-core membership, rather than popular support for terror activities.
Volume (Year): 16 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, "undated". "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers 137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287, November.