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The Life Cycle of Terrorist Organizations

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  • Peter Phillips

Abstract

It is a fact that terrorist organizations come and go. This empirical fact tends to draw attention to the demise of the terrorist organization and distracts from the dynamics of the terrorist organization’s life cycle. In this respect, the extant literature suffers from a serious weakness that is symptomatic of the absence from the literature of a rigorous theoretical explanation for the life cycle of terrorist organizations. This paper aims to address this by developing a theoretical explanation for the life cycle of terrorist organizations that is centered on competition for grassroots or popular support between the terrorist organization and the government. The decline and demise of a particular terrorist organization is not certain ex ante and a terrorist organization may be expected to be most dangerous not in its death throes, but during its early years as it competes with the government for grassroots support. These appear to be different conclusions to those that characterise some parts of the literature on this subject. The theoretical explanation developed herein also predicts a cyclical oscillation of conflict. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2011

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Phillips, 2011. "The Life Cycle of Terrorist Organizations," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 17(4), pages 369-385, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:17:y:2011:i:4:p:369-385:10.1007/s11294-011-9314-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11294-011-9314-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Kjell Hausken & Sheheryar Banuri & Dipak Gupta & Klaus Abbink, 2015. "Al Qaeda at the bar: coordinating ideologues and mercenaries in terrorist organizations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 57-73, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terrorist organization; Life cycle; Grassroots support; Conflict; Demise; Cyclical; Defence; H56; D74; D81;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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