IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/dyngam/v7y2017i3d10.1007_s13235-016-0188-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intertemporal Versus Spatial Externalities in Counterterror Policy Games

Author

Listed:
  • João Ricardo Faria

    () (University of Texas at El Paso)

  • Emilson C. D. Silva

    () (University of Alberta)

  • Daniel G. Arce

    () (University of Texas at Dallas)

Abstract

This paper studies a dynamic game between two national governments that fight a common terrorist organization that is seeking to mount a transnational terror campaign. It is the first examination that combines the temporal externalities associated with a sustained campaign with the spatial externalities that occur when the effects of one government’s counterterror policy spill over into another country. We consider two types of noncooperative behavior; one in which national authorities are sensitive to the reactions of the terrorists on foreign soil and another in which they are insensitive. It is shown that foreign terrorist sensitivity is preferred to insensitivity. Moreover, unilaterally accounting for terrorist reactions on foreign soil can be preferred to full policy coordination between governments. This then feeds into policy recommendations as to when each nation finds it desirable to coordinate transnational counterterror policy.

Suggested Citation

  • João Ricardo Faria & Emilson C. D. Silva & Daniel G. Arce, 2017. "Intertemporal Versus Spatial Externalities in Counterterror Policy Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 402-421, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0188-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0188-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-016-0188-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
    2. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, September.
    3. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2005. "IDS Models of Airline Security," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(2), pages 201-217, April.
    4. Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce & Walter Enders, 2011. "An Evaluation of Interpol's Cooperative-Based Counterterrorism Linkages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 79-110.
    5. Dockner, Engelbert J & Feichtinger, Gustav, 1993. "Cyclical Consumption Patterns and Rational Addiction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 256-263, March.
    6. Kareen Rozen, 2010. "Foundations of Intrinsic Habit Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1341-1373, July.
    7. Walter Enders & Todd Sandler, 2000. "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(3), pages 307-332, June.
    8. Boyer, Marcel, 1983. "Rational demand and expenditures patterns under habit formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 27-53, October.
    9. Iannaccone, Laurence R., 1986. "Addiction and satiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 95-99.
    10. Harl E. Ryder & Geoffrey M. Heal, 1973. "Optimal Growth with Intertemporally Dependent Preferences," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 1-31.
    11. Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "A Theory of Rational Addiction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 675-700, August.
    12. Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 2000. "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1823, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    13. S. Blomberg & Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2011. "Terrorist group survival: ideology, tactics, and base of operations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 441-463, December.
    14. Joao Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2005. "Terror Support And Recruitment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 263-273.
    15. Das, Satya P., 2008. "Some mechanisms of terror cycles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 644-656, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria & Timothy Mathews, 2019. "A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 229-248, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Spatial spillovers; Intertemporal spillovers; Counterterrorism; Coordination failures; History-dependent preferences;

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0188-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.