IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/dyngam/v7y2017i3d10.1007_s13235-016-0188-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intertemporal Versus Spatial Externalities in Counterterror Policy Games

Author

Listed:
  • João Ricardo Faria

    (University of Texas at El Paso)

  • Emilson C. D. Silva

    (University of Alberta)

  • Daniel G. Arce

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

Abstract

This paper studies a dynamic game between two national governments that fight a common terrorist organization that is seeking to mount a transnational terror campaign. It is the first examination that combines the temporal externalities associated with a sustained campaign with the spatial externalities that occur when the effects of one government’s counterterror policy spill over into another country. We consider two types of noncooperative behavior; one in which national authorities are sensitive to the reactions of the terrorists on foreign soil and another in which they are insensitive. It is shown that foreign terrorist sensitivity is preferred to insensitivity. Moreover, unilaterally accounting for terrorist reactions on foreign soil can be preferred to full policy coordination between governments. This then feeds into policy recommendations as to when each nation finds it desirable to coordinate transnational counterterror policy.

Suggested Citation

  • João Ricardo Faria & Emilson C. D. Silva & Daniel G. Arce, 2017. "Intertemporal Versus Spatial Externalities in Counterterror Policy Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 402-421, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0188-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0188-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-016-0188-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s13235-016-0188-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, December.
    2. Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce & Walter Enders, 2011. "An Evaluation of Interpol's Cooperative-Based Counterterrorism Linkages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 79-110.
    3. Kareen Rozen, 2010. "Foundations of Intrinsic Habit Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1341-1373, July.
    4. Walter Enders & Todd Sandler, 2000. "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(3), pages 307-332, June.
    5. Boyer, Marcel, 1983. "Rational demand and expenditures patterns under habit formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 27-53, October.
    6. Boyer, Marcel, 1978. "A Habit Forming Optimal Growth Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 19(3), pages 585-609, October.
    7. S. Blomberg & Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2011. "Terrorist group survival: ideology, tactics, and base of operations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 441-463, December.
    8. Joao Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2005. "Terror Support And Recruitment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 263-273.
    9. Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre‐emption," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
    10. Das, Satya P., 2008. "Some mechanisms of terror cycles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 644-656, September.
    11. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2005. "IDS Models of Airline Security," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(2), pages 201-217, April.
    12. Dockner, Engelbert J & Feichtinger, Gustav, 1993. "Cyclical Consumption Patterns and Rational Addiction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 256-263, March.
    13. Iannaccone, Laurence R., 1986. "Addiction and satiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 95-99.
    14. A. J. Novak & G. Feichtinger & G. Leitmann, 2010. "A Differential Game Related to Terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg Strategies," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 533-555, March.
    15. Harl E. Ryder & Geoffrey M. Heal, 1973. "Optimal Growth with Intertemporally Dependent Preferences," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(1), pages 1-31.
    16. G. Feichtinger & A. J. Novak, 2008. "Terror and Counterterror Operations: Differential Game with Cyclical Nash Solution," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 541-556, December.
    17. Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 2000. "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1823, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Carlos Pestana Barros & Isabel Proenca & Joao Ricardo Faria & Luis Gil-Alana, 2007. "Are Usa Citizens At Risk Of Terrorism In Europe?," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(6), pages 495-507.
    19. Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "A Theory of Rational Addiction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 675-700, August.
    20. Sandler, Todd & Arce, Daniel G., 2007. "Terrorism: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 775-813, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria & Timothy Mathews, 2019. "A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 229-248, June.
    2. João Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2021. "The Path of Terror Attacks," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-11, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. João Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2021. "The Path of Terror Attacks," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-11, April.
    2. Jacobs Martin, 2016. "Accounting for Changing Tastes: Approaches to Explaining Unstable Individual Preferences," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 67(2), pages 121-183, August.
    3. Dockner, Engelbert J & Feichtinger, Gustav, 1993. "Cyclical Consumption Patterns and Rational Addiction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 256-263, March.
    4. Morhaim, Lisa & Ulus, Ayşegül Yıldız, 2023. "On history-dependent optimization models: A unified framework to analyze models with habits, satiation and optimal growth," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    5. Champarnaud, Luc & Michel, Philippe, 2000. "Biens culturels, transmission de culture et croissance," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(4), pages 501-520, décembre.
    6. Daniel Arce & Sneha Bakshi & Rachel Croson & Catherine Eckel & Enrique Fatas & Malcolm Kass, 2011. "Counterterrorism strategies in the lab," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 465-478, December.
    7. Bakker, Craig & Webster, Jennifer B. & Nowak, Kathleen E. & Chatterjee, Samrat & Perkins, Casey J. & Brigantic, Robert, 2020. "Multi-Game Modeling for Counter-Smuggling," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    8. ÖZGÜR, Onur & BISIN, Alberto, 2011. "Dynamic Linear Economies with Social Interactions," Cahiers de recherche 04-2011, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    9. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Subsidizing Addiction: Do State Health Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 175-198, January.
    10. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2011. "The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two‐stage Game," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(311), pages 546-564, July.
    11. Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2013. "Determinants of the Demise of Terrorist Organizations," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 79(4), pages 774-792, April.
    12. Dragone, Davide, 2009. "A rational eating model of binges, diets and obesity," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 799-804, July.
    13. Jonathan Caulkins & Gustav Feichtinger & Richard Hartl & Peter Kort & Andreas Novak & Andrea Seidl, 2013. "Multiple equilibria and indifference-threshold points in a rational addiction model," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 21(3), pages 507-522, September.
    14. João Ricardo Faria & Andreas Novak & Aniruddha Bagchi & Timothy Mathews, 2020. "The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-13, June.
    15. João Ricardo Faria & Gonçalo Monteiro, 2008. "The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 370-380, September.
    16. Drugeon, Jean-Pierre & Wigniolle, Bertrand, 2007. "On time preference, rational addiction and utility satiation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 249-286, April.
    17. Charlinda Santifort & Todd Sandler, 2013. "Terrorist success in hostage-taking missions: 1978–2010," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 125-137, July.
    18. Pagano, Patrizio, 2004. "Habit persistence and the marginal propensity to consume in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 316-329, September.
    19. Wang Ruqu, 2007. "The Optimal Consumption and the Quitting of Harmful Addictive Goods," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-38, February.
    20. Chen Zhen & Michael K. Wohlgenant, 2006. "Meat Demand under Rational Habit Persistence," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 54(4), pages 477-495, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Spatial spillovers; Intertemporal spillovers; Counterterrorism; Coordination failures; History-dependent preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0188-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.