Nonconvex n-person bargaining: efficient maxmin solutions
This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin solutions for some bargaining problems, there is typically a unique efficient maxmin solution. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
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