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Bargaining Theory over Opportunity Assignments and the Egalitarian Solution

Author

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  • Xu, Yongsheng
  • Yoshihara, Naoki
  • 吉原, 直毅
  • ヨシハラ, ナオキ

Abstract

This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the principle of "equal opportunity" for all players to make the recommendation on resource allocations. A framework in such a context is developed and the egalitarian solution to standard bargaining problems is reformulated and axiomatically characterized.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2009. "Bargaining Theory over Opportunity Assignments and the Egalitarian Solution," Discussion Paper Series a517, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a517
    Note: First Version: December, 2005; This version: March 2009
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    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    2. Sakamoto, Norihito, 2017. "Characterizations of Social Choice Correspondences Based on Equality of Capabilities in a Pure Exchange Economy," RCNE Discussion Paper Series 4, Research Center for Normative Economics, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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