On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
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- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2007. "On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard," LSF Research Working Paper Series 07-01, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2015.
"On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition,"
TSE Working Papers
15-609, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2015. "On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition," Working Papers 2015-632, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012.
"Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2011. "Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness," CEIS Research Paper 196, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Jun 2011.
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- Gwenael Piaser, 2005. "Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-6.
- repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-049 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nedelchev, Miroslav, 2014. "Decrease of ‘Principal-Principal’ Conflicts," MPRA Paper 64541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
- Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games," Working Papers 2014-49, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
More about this item
KeywordsMoral hazard Multiple principals Multiple agents Simple mechanisms;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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