We analyze an equilibrium concept called revision-proofness for infinite-horizon games played by a dynasty of players. Revision-proofness requires strategies to be robust to joint deviations by multiple players and is a refinement of sub-game perfection. Sub-game perfect paths that can only be sustained by reversion to paths with payoffs below those of an alternative path are not revision-proof. However, for the important class of quasi-recursive games careful construction of off-equilibrium play can render many, and in some cases all, sub-game perfect paths revision-proof.
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