Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences
We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called (beta)-(delta)) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and use this set to characterize the equilibrium payoff set U(beta,delta). While Strotz-Pollak equilibrium and subgame perfection differ here, the generated paths and payoffs do coincide. We then explore the cost of the present-time bias. Fixing the total present value of 1 util flow, lower (beta) or higher (delta) shrinks the payoff set. Surprisingly, unless the minimax outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the equilibrium payoff set U(beta, delta) is not monotonic in (beta) or (delta). While the set U(beta, delta) is contained in that of a standard repeated game with greater discount factor, the present-time bias precludes any lower bound on U(beta, delta) that would easily generalize the (beta) = 1 folk-theorem.
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