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Self-Reputation and Perception of Reputation

  • Jung Hun Cho
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    This paper examines how the belief of decision maker regarding his ability to keep a resolution and his belief regarding what others think of him affect his actions. Higher self-reputation increases future payoff but higher perception of reputation can either increase or decrease it for an individual who has a strong ability to keep a resolution. However, both higher self-reputation and higher perception of reputation may not help increase future payoff for a decision maker who has a weak ability to resist temptation if he makes a resolution relatively easily in the second period. These results help to explain why some people ask for help or do not ask for help from friends to keep a resolution and why some people can or cannot sustain the resolution in the short run.

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    File URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp343.pdf
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    Paper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp343.

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    Date of creation: Nov 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp343
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