Repeated Games with Recursive Utility:Cournot Duopoly under Gain/Loss Asymmetry
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Shalev, Jonathan, 1997. "Loss aversion in a multi-period model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 203-226, June.
- Chade, Hector & Prokopovych, Pavlo & Smith, Lones, 2008.
"Repeated games with present-biased preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 157-175, March.
- Hector Chade & Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, "undated". "Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences," Working Papers 2173938, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
- Hector Chade & Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, 2006. "Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1555, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
More about this item
KeywordsCournot duopoly; gain/loss asymmetry; optimal penal code; repeated game; recursive utility; utility smoothing;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2016-07-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2016-07-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2016-07-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2016-07-09 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kue:epaper:e-16-006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Graduate School of Economics Project Center). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fekyojp.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.