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Endogenous Market Incompleteness with Investment Risks

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  • Meh, Césaire A.
  • Quadrini, Vincenzo

Abstract

This Paper studies a general equilibrium economy in which agents have the ability to invest in a risky technology. The investment risk cannot be fully insured with optimal contracts because shocks are private information. We show that the presence of investment risks leads to under-accumulation of capital relative to an economy where idiosyncratic shocks can be fully insured. We also show that the availability of state-contingent (optimal) contracts – compared to simple debt contracts – brings the aggregate stock of capital close to the complete markets level. Institutional reforms that make possible the use of these contracts have important welfare consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Meh, Césaire A. & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Endogenous Market Incompleteness with Investment Risks," CEPR Discussion Papers 4807, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4807
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Angeletos, George-Marios & Panousi, Vasia, 2011. "Financial integration, entrepreneurial risk and global dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 863-896, May.
    2. Covas, Francisco, 2006. "Uninsured idiosyncratic production risk with borrowing constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2167-2190, November.
    3. Maik Heinemann & Alexander Wulff, 2015. "Idiosyncratic Risk, Borrowing Constraints and Financial Integration - A Discussion of Ambiguous Results," Working Papers 2015019, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
    4. claudio Michelacci & Fabiano Schivardi, 2008. "Does Idiosyncratic Business Risk Matter?," EIEF Working Papers Series 0813, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Jul 2008.
    5. Mele, Antonio, 2014. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
    6. Francisco Covas & Shigeru Fujita, 2007. "Private risk premium and aggregate uncertainty in the model of uninsurable investment risk," Working Papers 07-30, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    7. Damiano Sandri, 2014. "Growth and Capital Flows with Risky Entrepreneurship," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 102-123, July.
    8. Caggese, Andrea, 2012. "Entrepreneurial risk, investment, and innovation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 287-307.
    9. Panousi, Vasia, 2009. "Financial Integration and Capital Accumulation," MPRA Paper 24238, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Wulff, Alexander & Heinemann, Maik, 2015. "Idiosyncratic Risk, Borrowing Constraints and Financial Integration - A Discussion of Ambiguous Results," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113165, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Dunbar, Geoffrey, 2013. "Returns-to-scale and the equity premium puzzle," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 1736-1754.
    12. Carlson Mark A & King Thomas & Lewis Kurt, 2011. "Distress in the Financial Sector and Economic Activity," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, June.
    13. Angeletos, George-Marios & Panousi, Vasia, 2009. "Revisiting the supply side effects of government spending," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 137-153, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aggregate Capital; Asymmetric Information; optimal contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E20 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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