Education, Mobility of Labour and Tax Competition
We show that wage-taxfinanced subsidies encourage investment in risky education andoffer welfare gains. Tax competition and labour mobility maylead to substantial erosion of regional taxation. On the otherhand, mobility insures against region-specific shocks encouraginginvestment in education. Thus, welfare effects on the educatedand the owners of the fixed factor may go in either direction.Tax competition is especially fierce if the governments careabout the owners of the fixed factor. Elimination of their interestsfrom the governments' objective functions results in a Pareto-improvementin a federation with tax competition. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wildasin, David E, 1992.
"Relaxation of Barriers to Factor Mobility and Income Redistribution,"
Public Finance = Finances publiques,
, vol. 47(Supplemen), pages 216-30.
- Wildasin, D.E., 1991. "Ralaxation of Barriers to factor Mobilty and Income Redistribution," Papers 92-009, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Wildasin, David E, 1995. " Factor Mobility, Risk and Redistribution in the Welfare State," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 527-46, December.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
- Wildasin, D.E., 1992.
"Income Restribution and Migration,"
92-003, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 1995.
"Social Insurance, Incentives, and Risk Taking,"
NBER Working Papers
5335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994.
"How much Europe? Subsidiarity, centralization and fiscal competition,"
Munich Reprints in Economics
19838, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994. "How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(1), pages 85-107, February.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1993. "How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hamilton, Jonathan H, 1987. "Optimal Wage and Income Taxation with Wage Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 373-88, June.
- Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-74, September.
- David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 73-95, March.
- Levhari, David & Weiss, Yoram, 1974. "The Effect of Risk on the Investment in Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 950-63, December.
- Wellisch, Dietmar & Wildasin, David E., 1996. "Decentralized income redistribution and immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 187-217, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:7:y:2000:i:6:p:699-719. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.