Education, mobility of labour and tax competition
We show that wage-tax financed subsidies encourage investment in riskyeducation and offer welfare gains. Tax competition and labour mobilitymay lead to substantial erosion of regional taxation. On the other hand,mobility insures against region-specific shocks encouraging investmentin education. Thus, welfare effects on the educated and the owners ofthe fixed factor may go in either direction. Tax competition isespecially fierce if the governments care about the owners of the fixedfactor. Elimination of their interests from the governments’ objectivefunctions results in a Pareto-improvement in a federation with taxcompetition.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in International Tax and Public Finance 6 7(2000): pp. 699-719|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:19303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.