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Global Competition for Mobile Resources: Implications for Equity, Efficiency, and Political Economy

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  • David E. Wildasin

    () (Martin School of Public Policy and Administration and Department of Economics, University of Kentucky)

Abstract

International integration of markets for labor and capital has far-reaching policy implications in economies where governments pursue extensive programs of redistribution through tax and transfer policies. The large fiscal impacts that result from movement of high- and low-income populations, as well as of capital, affect the benefits, costs, and political payoffs of redistributive policies, creating incentives for fiscal competition that may limit the extent of redistribution over time. Migration and capital flows are dynamic adjustment mechanisms, analysis of which can shed light on the consequences of structural changes such as globalization of factor markets and EU enlargement.

Suggested Citation

  • David E. Wildasin, 2005. "Global Competition for Mobile Resources: Implications for Equity, Efficiency, and Political Economy," Working Papers 2005-08, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
  • Handle: RePEc:ifr:wpaper:2005-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bierbrauer, Felix & Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2013. "Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 292-311.
    2. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2009. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1206-1217.
    3. Wildasin, David E., 2007. "Pre–Emption: Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, pages 649-662.
    4. Wildasin, David E., 2011. "Fiscal competition for imperfectly-mobile labor and capital: A comparative dynamic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1312-1321.
    5. Eloi Laurent, 2007. "From Competition to Constitution: Races to Bottoms and the Rise of 'Shadow' Social Europe," Working Papers hal-00972706, HAL.
    6. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," Working Papers 2006-15, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    7. Francis Bloch & Unal Zenginobuz, 2012. "Oates' Decentralization Theorem with Household Mobility," Working Papers hal-00657823, HAL.
    8. Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2005. "A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," Working Papers 2006-04, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3530 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Francis Bloch & Ünal Zenginobuz, 2015. "Oates’ decentralization theorem with imperfect household mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(3), pages 353-375, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal Competition;

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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