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The Property Tax Incidence Debate and the Mix of State and Local Finance of Local Public Expenditures

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  • George R. Zodrow

Abstract

Many states in the US have in recent years changed the mix of state and local revenue sources used to finance local public expenditures, especially primary and secondary education, with local property taxes being replaced by various sources of state tax revenue. This article examines the desirability of such a tax substitution, focusing on the implications of the long-standing debate between the 'benefit tax' and 'capital tax' views of the incidence of the tax. It also includes a discussion of some recent research that elaborates the capital tax view of the property tax. (JEL codes: H10, H21, H22, H71) Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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  • George R. Zodrow, 2007. "The Property Tax Incidence Debate and the Mix of State and Local Finance of Local Public Expenditures," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 53(4), pages 495-521, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:53:y:2007:i:4:p:495-521
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Di Porto Edoardo & Revelli Federico, 2009. "Central Command, Local Hazard and the Race to the Top," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 200909, University of Turin.
    2. Wildasin, David E., 2011. "Fiscal competition for imperfectly-mobile labor and capital: A comparative dynamic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1312-1321.
    3. Paweł Felis, 2015. "Funkcja fiskalna i społeczna w powierzchniowym systemie opodatkowania nieruchomości na przykładzie gmin w Polsce," Gospodarka Narodowa, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 133-158.
    4. Cristian Sepulveda & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2012. "Explaining property tax collections in developing countries: the case of Latin America," Chapters,in: Decentralization and Reform in Latin America, chapter 7, pages iii-iii Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Athiphat Muthitacharoen & George R. Zodrow, 2008. "The Efficiency Costs of Local Property Tax," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0815, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Fernando M. Aragon, 2013. "Local Spending, Transfers, and Costly Tax Collection," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 66(2), pages 343-370, June.
    7. Athiphat Muthitacharoen & George R. Zodrow, 2012. "Revisiting the Excise Tax Effects of the Property Tax: Working Paper 2012-05," Working Papers 42926, Congressional Budget Office.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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