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Central Command, Local Hazard and the Race to the Top

This paper explores for the first time the consequences of centrally imposed local tax limitations on the modelling and estimation of spatial auto-correlation in local fiscal policies, and compares three spatial interaction estimators: a) the conventional maximum likelihood estimator that ignores censoring; b) a spatial Tobit estimator; c) a discrete hazard estimator. Implementation of the above empirical approaches on the case of local vehicle taxation in Italy provides a reasonably coherent picture in terms of the direction and size of the spatial interaction process, and offers a plausible spatial interpretation of the race to the top in provincial Vehicle taxes.

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File URL: http://www.unito.it/unitoWAR/ShowBinary/FSRepo/D031/Allegati/WP2009Dip/9_WP_Revelli_DiPorto.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Turin in its series Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers with number 200909.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uto:dipeco:200909
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  1. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  2. Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas, 2000. "Federal Mandates by Popular Demand," IDEI Working Papers 120, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2001.
  3. Isabelle Joumard & Per Mathis Kongsrud, 2003. "Fiscal Relations across Government Levels," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 375, OECD Publishing.
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  6. Sole Olle, Albert, 2003. "Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 685-713, November.
  7. Jan K. Brueckner & Luz A. Saavedra, 2000. "Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-Tax Competition?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0357, Econometric Society.
  8. Nikolaus Hautsch & Stefan Klotz, 2001. "Estimating the Neighborhood Influence on Decision Makers: Theory and an Application on the Analysis of Innovation Decisions," CoFE Discussion Paper 01-04, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
  9. Revelli Federico, 2008. "Performance Competition in Local Media Markets," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 200801, University of Turin.
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  11. George R. Zodrow, 2007. "The Property Tax Incidence Debate and the Mix of State and Local Finance of Local Public Expenditures," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 53(4), pages 495-521, December.
  12. Thomas J. Nechyba, 1996. "Local Property and State Income Taxes: The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition and Collusion," NBER Working Papers 5419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Case, Anne, 1992. "Neighborhood influence and technological change," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 491-508, September.
  14. Anwar Shah, 2006. "Fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic management," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 437-462, August.
  15. Stefan Suter & Felix Walter, 2001. "Environmental Pricing-Theory and Practice: The Swiss Policy of Heavy Vehicle Taxation," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 35(3), pages 381-397, September.
  16. Manski, Charles F, 1993. "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 531-42, July.
  17. Jon Fiva & Jørn Rattsø, 2007. "Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 457-470, September.
  18. Peltzman, Sam, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-61, May.
  19. Bard Harstad, 2006. "Flexible Integration," Discussion Papers 1428, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Douglas Sutherland & Robert Price & Isabelle Joumard, 2005. "Sub-central government fiscal rules," OECD Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2005(2), pages 141-181.
  21. Figlio, David N., 1997. "Did the "tax revolt" reduce school performance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 245-269, September.
  22. Downes, Thomas A. & Dye, Richard F. & McGuire, Therese J., 1998. "Do Limits Matter? Evidence on the Effects of Tax Limitations on Student Performance," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 401-417, May.
  23. Dye, Richard F. & McGuire, Therese J. & McMillen, Daniel P., 2005. "Are Property Tax Limitations More Binding over Time?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 58(2), pages 215-25, June.
  24. Antonio P�ez & Darren M Scott & Erik Volz, 2008. "A discrete-choice approach to modeling social influence on individual decision making," Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 35(6), pages 1055-1069, November.
  25. Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, D.L.Daniel L., 2004. "Comparative politics and environmental taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 705-722, July.
  26. Maarten Allers & J. Elhorst, 2005. "Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 493-513, August.
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