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Decentralization and Reform in Latin America

Editor

Listed:
  • Giorgio Brosio
  • Juan P. Jiménez

Abstract

Decentralisation and Reform in Latin America analyses the process of intergovernmental reform in Latin America in the last two decades and presents a number of emerging issues. These include the impacts of decentralization and the response of countries in the region to challenge such as social cohesion, interregional and interpersonal disparities, the assignment of social and infrastructure expenditure, macrofinancial shocks, fiscal rules and the sharing of natural resources revenue. The main aim of the book is to assess the effective working of decentralized arrangements and institutions, with a view of suggesting corrections and reforms where the system is not working according to expectations.

Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab

Suggested Citation

  • Giorgio Brosio & Juan P. Jiménez (ed.), 2012. "Decentralization and Reform in Latin America," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14949.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:14949
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Faguet, Jean-Paul, 2004. "Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs?: Evidence from Bolivia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 867-893, March.
    2. Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio, 2009. "Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?," Chapters, in: Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio (ed.), Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Tugrul Gurgur & Anwar Shah, 2014. "Localization and corruption: panacea or pandora's box?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 109-136, May.
    4. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
    5. Guillermo Perry & Jorge Armando Rodríguez, 1991. "Las finanzas intergubernamentales en la Constitución de 1991," Coyuntura Económica, Fedesarrollo, vol. 21(4), pages 65-83, December.
    6. Olson, Mancur, Jr, 1969. "The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 479-487, May.
    7. Ariel Fiszbein & Norbert Schady & Francisco H.G. Ferreira & Margaret Grosh & Niall Keleher & Pedro Olinto & Emmanuel Skoufias, 2009. "Conditional Cash Transfers : Reducing Present and Future Poverty," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2597.
    8. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & François Vaillancourt (ed.), 2011. "Decentralization in Developing Countries," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14175.
    9. Oates, Wallace E., 2008. "On the Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 61(2), pages 313-334, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Book Chapters

    The following chapters of this book are listed in IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Development Studies; Economics and Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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