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Fiscal competition for imperfectly-mobile labor and capital: A comparative dynamic analysis

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  • Wildasin, David E.

Abstract

Interjurisdictional flows of imperfectly-mobile migrants, investment, and other productive resources result in the costly dynamic adjustment of resource stocks. This paper investigates the comparative dynamics of adjustment to changes in local fiscal policy with two imperfectly mobile productive resources. The intertemporal adjustments for both resources depend on complementarity/substitutability in production and the adjustment cost technologies for each, implying that the evaluation of the fiscal treatment of one resource must account for the simultaneous adjustment of both.

Suggested Citation

  • Wildasin, David E., 2011. "Fiscal competition for imperfectly-mobile labor and capital: A comparative dynamic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1312-1321.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:11:p:1312-1321 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.014
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    Cited by:

    1. Han, Yutao & Pieretti, Patrice & Zou, Benteng, 2013. "An extension of the home-attachment criteria under dynamic tax competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 508-510.
    2. Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti & Benteng Zou, 2013. "The Dynamics of the Location of Firms – A Revisit of Home-Attachment under Tax Competition," CREA Discussion Paper Series 13-15, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
    3. Tidiane Ly, 2016. "Sub-metropolitan Tax Competition with Household and Capital Mobility," Working Papers halshs-01349869, HAL.
    4. Haufler, Andreas & Lülfesmann, Christoph, 2015. "Reforming an asymmetric union: On the virtues of dual tier capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 116-127.
    5. Agrawal, David R., 2014. "LOST in America: Evidence on local sales taxes from national panel data," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 147-163.
    6. Buiter, Willem H. & Sibert, Anne C., 2016. "Government deficits in large open economies: The problem of too little public debt," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 10, pages 1-39.
    7. Yutao Han & Zhen Song, 2017. "On regional integration, fiscal income, and GDP per capita," CEMA Working Papers 600, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
    8. Miyazaki, Takeshi, 2016. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Tax Efforts: Evidence from Japan," MPRA Paper 74337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Han, Yutao & Pieretti, Patrice & Zanaj, Skerdilajda & Zou, Benteng, 2014. "Asymmetric competition among nation states: A differential game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 71-79.
    10. Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, 2017. "Tax competition and federal equalization schemes with decentralized leadership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 164-178, February.
    11. repec:eee:pubeco:v:155:y:2017:i:c:p:147-163 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Karl R. Geisler & Mark W. Nichols, 2016. "Riverboat casino gambling impacts on employment and income in host and surrounding counties," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 56(1), pages 101-123, January.
    13. Huang, Wei Hong & Chen, Yang & Rudkin, Simon, 2014. "Dynamic Fiscal competition with public infrastructure investment: Austerity and attracting capital inflow," RIEI Working Papers 2014-03, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Research Institute for Economic Integration, revised 02 Mar 2016.
    14. Tidiane Ly, 2016. "Sub-metropolitan Tax Competition with Household and Capital Mobility," Working Papers 1624, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal competition; Dynamic tax incidence;

    JEL classification:

    • B23 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Econometrics; Quantitative and Mathematical Studies
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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