Does the Welfare State Destroy the Family?
We analyze the relationship between the family and the Welfare State when intra-family transfers are governed by risk-sharing considerations (i.e. not by altruism). For the benchmarl case, the classic neutrality result is obtained: more generous unemployment benefits, provided by the State, crowd out family risk-sharing arrangements one-for-one. The model is extended to capture the idea that families have an advantage at monitoring the search activities of the unemployed, whereas the State has an advantage at enforcing risk-sharing contracts through taxation.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ|
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:99195. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Monica Birds)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.