Information and Economic Efficiency
Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk markets "constrained" Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to which we have contributed) that it is not. In this paper, we delineate the differences in assumptions between the two sets of papers, and under our assumptions present an intuitive proof of the Pareto inefficiency of market equilibrium with moral hazard and identify what it is that the government can do that the market cannot.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1993|
|Publication status:||published as Information Economics and Policy Vol. 6 (1994), pp. 77-88|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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- Grossman, Sanford J., 1977. "A characterization of the optimality of equilibrium in incomplete markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, June.
- Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984.
"Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
- Edward C Prescott & Robert M Townsend, 2010. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2069, David K. Levine.
- Arnott, Richard J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Labor Turnover, Wage Structures, and Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 434-462, October.
- Newbery, David M G & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "The Choice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market Equilibrium with Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 223-246, April.
- Steven Shavell, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-562.
- Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-264.
- Geanakoplos, J. & Magill, M. & Quinzii, M. & Dreze, J., 1990. "Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 113-151.
- Geanakoplos, J. & Magill, M. & Quinzii, M. & Dreze, J., "undated". "Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete," CORE Discussion Papers RP 916, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- John Geanakoplos & Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii & J. Dreze, 1988. "Generic Inefficiency of Stock Market Equilibrium When Markets Are Incomplete," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 863, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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