Insurance and Incentive Effects of Transfers among Regions: Equity and Efficiency
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Johnson, William R, 1988. "Income Redistribution in a Federal System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 570-573, June.
- Bent E. Soerensen & Pierfederico Asdrubali & Oved Yosha, "undated".
"Channels of Interstate Risksharing: US 1963-1990,"
EPRU Working Paper Series
95-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- P. Asdrubali & Bent E. Sørensen & Oved Yosha, 1995. "Channels of Interstate Risksharing : US 1963-1990," Working Papers 95-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Asdrubali, P. & Sorensen, B.E. & Yosha, O., 1995. "Channels of Interstate Risksharing: U.S. 1963-1990," Papers 07-95, Tel Aviv.
- Bucovetsky, Sam, 1991. "Choosing tax rates and public expenditure levels using majority rule," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 113-131, October.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1998. "Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 989-1008, July.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
- Wildasin, David E. & Wilson, John Douglas, 1998. "Risky local tax bases: risk-pooling vs. rent-capture," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 229-247, June.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
- Michael Smart, 1996. "Taxation incentives and deadweight loss in a system of intergovernmental transfers," Working Papers msmart-96-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-774, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- GRECO, Luciano, 2003. "Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution," CORE Discussion Papers 2003024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Vermeulen, W. & Allers, Maarten, 2014. "Fiscal equalization, capitalization and the flypaper effect," Research Report 14023-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Ogawa, Hikaru & Wang, Wenming, 2016. "Asymmetric tax competition and fiscal equalization in a repeated game setting," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-10.
- Wildasin, David E., 2004.
"The Institutions of Federalism: Toward an Analytical Framework,"
National Tax Journal,
National Tax Association, pages 247-272.
- David E. Wildasin, 2004. "The Institutions of Federalism: Toward an Analytical Framework," Public Economics 0403006, EconWPA.
- Buettner, Thiess, 2009. "The contribution of equalization transfers to fiscal adjustment: Empirical results for German municipalities and a US-German comparison," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 417-431, September.
- Robert Fenge & Jakob von Weizsäcker, 2001. "How Much Fiscal Equalization? A Constitutional Approach," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 623-623, December.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Seitz, Helmut, 2001.
"Fiscal federalism and risk sharing in Germany: the role of size differences
[Risikokonsolidierung im Rahmen des deutschen Länderfinanzausgleichs: die Rolle von Größenunterschieden]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-20, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Wouter Vermeulen & Maarten Allers, 2013. "Fiscal Equalization and Capitalization: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CPB Discussion Paper 245, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Hans-Günter Krüsselberg, 2005. "Milton Friedman und der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen Elternkompetenz und Anteilscheine am Schulbudget – Gedanken über Reformpotenziale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200506, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- repec:dgr:rugsom:14023-eef is not listed on IDEAS
- Wallace Oates, 2005. "Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pages 349-373, August.
More about this item
KeywordsFederalism; Uncertainty; Risk Aversion; Redistribution;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:4:y:1997:i:4:p:463-483. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.