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Welfare financing

Author

Listed:
  • Toolsema-Veldman, Linda
  • Allers, M.A.

    (Groningen University)

Abstract

Welfare is often administered locally, but financed through grants from the central government. This raises the question how the central government can prevent local governments from spending more than necessary. Block grants are more efficient than matching grants, because the latter reduce the local governments

Suggested Citation

  • Toolsema-Veldman, Linda & Allers, M.A., 2012. "Welfare financing," Research Report 12004-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    • Handle: RePEc:gro:rugsom:12004-eef
    as

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11370/2e819e13-16f0-458d-a865-b6d40aa4dee7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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