Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way distortion
We analyze the choice of incentive contracts by olipolistic ?rms that compete on the product market. Managers have private information and in the ?rst stage they exert cost reducing e¤ort. In equilibrium the standard ?no distortion at the top? property disappears and two way distortions are optimal. We extend our analysis to other informational, contractual and competitive settings.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2010|
|Date of revision:||Nov 2010|
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