Contract Competition between Hierarchies, Managerial Compensation and Imperfectly Correlated Shocks
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- Michela Cella & Federico Etro, 2016. "Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(3), pages 193-218, July.
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More about this item
Keywordsoligopoly; screening; two way distortion; incentives; investments;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-03-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2016-03-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2016-03-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2016-03-06 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2016-03-06 (Microeconomics)
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