Risky Allocations from a Risk-Neutral Informed Principal
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Other versions of this item:
- Michela Cella, 2005. "Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(3), pages 191-202, August.
References listed on IDEAS
- Cella, Michela, 2008.
"Informed principal with correlation,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 433-456, November.
- Michela Cella, 2006. "Informed Principal with Correlation," Economics Series Working Papers 261, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Michela CELLA, 2007. "Informed principal with correlation," Departmental Working Papers 2007-11, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
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- Cho, Wonjoo & Blandford, David, 2015. "Bilateral information asymmetry and irreversible practice adoption through agri-environmental policy: an application to peat land retirement in Norway," 89th Annual Conference, April 13-15, 2015, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 204212, Agricultural Economics Society.
More about this item
KeywordsContract; Adverse Selection; Informed Principal; Risk Aversion;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-FMK-2006-03-18 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-UPT-2006-03-18 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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