A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale
Zheng has proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-privatevalue environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zhengâ€™s construction requires novel conditions â€” Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance â€” on the biddersâ€™ value distribution profile. The only known examples of distribution profiles satisfying these conditions in environments with three or more bidders are uniform distributions. Our characterization result shows that Zhengâ€™s conditions, while being strong, are satisfied by many non-uniform distribution profiles. A crucial step in our analysis is to show that Invariance implies Resale Monotonicity and Transitivity.
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