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Multilevel Mediation in Symmetric Trees

Author

Listed:
  • Polanski Arnold

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Cardona Daniel

    (Universitat de Les Illes Balears and Centre de Recerca en Economia del Benestar)

Abstract

The flourishing internet-based trade motivates our model of two-sided markets with multilevel mediation, in which a seller, intermediaries at various levels and buyers are embedded in a symmetric tree. Adapting the framework of the single-unit first price auction to trees, we show, in particular, the irrelevance of the tree structure for the buyers and order symmetric trees with respect to the seller's payoff. Furthermore, we characterize stable mediation structures in the presence of link (search) costs. Our results here confirm the stability of disintermediation.

Suggested Citation

  • Polanski Arnold & Cardona Daniel, 2012. "Multilevel Mediation in Symmetric Trees," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-23, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:11:y:2012:i:3:n:8
    DOI: 10.1515/1446-9022.1329
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    References listed on IDEAS

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