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Transmisión eléctrica y la “ley corta”: por qué licitar es (mucho) mejor que regular (Electricity transmission and the short law: why offering for tender is [much] better than regulation)

  • Alexander Galetovic
  • Juan Ricardo Inostroza
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    Existen a lo menos dos procedimientos para fijar los peajes que deben pagar los usuarios de líneas de transmisión. Uno consiste en regularlos en un proceso estándar. El otro, adjudicar las líneas en licitaciones competitivas por menor peaje. En este trabajo mostramos que los peajes esperados son inambiguamente menores si las líneas se licitan. Las licitaciones dominan a la regulación por tres razones: primero, la competencia garantiza peajes esperados más bajos; segundo, la licitación aumenta el poder de negociación del regulador; tercero, si como en Argentina, se permite que los beneficiarios del proyecto de transmisión participen en la licitación, éstos pueden inducir una competencia aún más intensa. Usamos nuestro modelo para analizar la licitación de la cuarta línea del Comahue en Argentina. Mostramos que, de haberse regulado, el peaje hubiera sido a lo menos 61% más alto. La versión de la ley corta actualmente en el Congreso mejora sustantivamente el proyecto original de mayo de 2002 porque adopta la licitación por menor canon para expansiones del sistema. Sin embargo, no lo adopta para ampliaciones de instalaciones existentes. Si se persiste en esta distinción, es conveniente limitar las ampliaciones únicamente a proyectos muy pequeños.

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    File URL: http://www.dii.uchile.cl/~cea/sitedev/cea/www/download.php?file=documentos_trabajo/ASOCFILE120040121105454.pdf
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    Paper provided by Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 177.

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    Date of creation: 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:177
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dii.uchile.cl/cea/

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    1. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," CEPR Discussion Papers 2163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1994. "Auctions vs. Negotiations," NBER Working Papers 4608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Juan-Pablo Montero & Salvador Valdés, 2003. "Notas para la Regulación Eficiente de la Transmisión Eléctrica," Documentos de Trabajo 242, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    4. Chisari, Omar O. & Dal-Bo, Pedro & Romero, Carlos A., 2001. "High-tension electricity network expansions in Argentina: decision mechanisms and willingness-to-pay revelation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 697-715, November.
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Manuel Angel Abdala & Andres Chambouleyron, 1999. "Transmission Investment in Competitive Power Systems : Decentralizing decisions in Argentina," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11466, The World Bank.
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