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Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice

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  • Marc S. Robinson

    (UCLA)

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  • Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:292
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp292.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    2. Douglas K. Reece, 1978. "Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 369-384, Autumn.
    3. David C. Nellor & Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Binding Future Governments: Tax Contracts and Resource Development," UCLA Economics Working Papers 297, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    5. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 340, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980. "State of the Art---Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 119-142, February.
    7. George Stigler, 2010. "Theory of Oligopoly," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 6.
    8. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    9. Hayne E. Leland, 1978. "Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 413-437.
    10. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
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    Cited by:

    1. Di Corato, Luca & Moretto, Michele, 2016. "Selling real assets: the impact of idiosyncratic project risk in an auction environment," Working Paper Series 2016:9, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department Economics.
    2. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 340, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. John G. Riley, 1986. "Ex Post Information in Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 367, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "The Welfare Cost of Resource Taxation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 376, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Daniel A Artana, 1989. "Las Regulaciones a los Hidrocarburos en Argentina: El Costo de los Controles de Precios," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 26(78), pages 263-280.
    6. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 15-16, pages 217-230.

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