Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice
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- Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October.
- Hayne E. Leland., 1975.
"Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS,"
Research Program in Finance Working Papers
38, University of California at Berkeley.
- J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Douglas K. Reece, 1978. "Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 369-384, Autumn.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- David C. Nellor & Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Binding Future Governments: Tax Contracts and Resource Development," UCLA Economics Working Papers 297, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 340, UCLA Department of Economics.
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