Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice
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- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Douglas K. Reece, 1978. "Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 369-384, Autumn.
- David C. Nellor & Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Binding Future Governments: Tax Contracts and Resource Development," UCLA Economics Working Papers 297, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 340, UCLA Department of Economics.
- George Stigler, 2010. "Theory of Oligopoly," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 6.
- J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hayne E. Leland, 1978. "Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 413-437.
- Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
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