Collusion and the Choice of Auction
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- Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981.
"The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction,"
462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1983. "Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 254, UCLA Department of Economics.
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