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Collusion and the Choice of Auction

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  • Marc S. Robinson

    (UCLA)

Abstract

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  • Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 340, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:340
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp340.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Milgrom, Paul & Weber, Robert J., 1982. "The value of information in a sealed-bid auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 105-114, June.
    4. Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1983. "Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 254, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. George Stigler, 2010. "Theory of Oligopoly," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 6.
    6. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    7. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics.

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