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Failure to Delegate and Loss of Control

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  • Mylovanov, Tymofiy

Abstract

This paper provides an explanation for the frequently observed phenomenon of “inefficient micromanagement†. I show that a supervisor may get comprehensively involved into activities of a subordinate although a better option of delegation is available. This inefficiency persists in the absence of conflict of preferences and even as the cost of delegation becomes zero. The paper also demonstrates that imposing constraints on communication with a subordinate can be beneficial for a superior.

Suggested Citation

  • Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2004. "Failure to Delegate and Loss of Control," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 130, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:130
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    File URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13421/1/130.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 155-165.
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