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Theories of Delegation in Political Science

Author

Listed:
  • Bendor, J.
  • Glazer, A.
  • Hammond, T.H.

Abstract

We survey modern models of delegation which assume that a boss and subordinate pursue their own goals. Among the major themes covered are thefolling: the conditions under which the boss will prefer to delegate versus those in which she will prefer to retain authority; the ways in which a boss can induce a subordinate to truthfully reveal information; when rational principals will use the ally principle; delegation in repeated interactions; and the ways in which delegation can overcome committment problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Bendor, J. & Glazer, A. & Hammond, T.H., 2000. "Theories of Delegation in Political Science," Papers 00-01-14, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:00-01-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jacques Cremer, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49.
    2. Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 911-920, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frederick J. Boehmke & Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2005. "Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making," Public Economics 0502009, EconWPA.
    2. repec:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1043-y is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Wrasai, Phongthorn & Swank, Otto H., 2007. "Policy makers, advisers, and reputation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 579-590, April.
    4. repec:spr:grdene:v:20:y:2011:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-009-9166-x is not listed on IDEAS
    5. John Nye, 2007. "Killing Private Ryan: An Institutional Analysis of Military Decision Making in World War II," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 281-308, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    MODELS ; INFORMATION ; LAW ; BANKS;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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