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Theories of Delegation in Political Science

  • Bendor, J.
  • Glazer, A.
  • Hammond, T.H.

We survey modern models of delegation which assume that a boss and subordinate pursue their own goals. Among the major themes covered are thefolling: the conditions under which the boss will prefer to delegate versus those in which she will prefer to retain authority; the ways in which a boss can induce a subordinate to truthfully reveal information; when rational principals will use the ally principle; delegation in repeated interactions; and the ways in which delegation can overcome committment problems.

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Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 00-01-14.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:00-01-14
Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

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  1. Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 911-20, December.
  2. Cremer, Jacques, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February.
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