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The Accounting Standards Setting Process in the U.S.: Examination of the SEC–FASB Relationship

Author

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  • Dan Palmon

    (Rutgers University)

  • Marietta Peytcheva

    (Lehigh University)

  • Ari Yezegel

    (Bentley University)

Abstract

In the U.S. there is a close relationship between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a governmental agency legally responsible for setting accounting standards, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a private sector body to whom the SEC has delegated this responsibility. In this paper we examine the influence of the SEC on the FASB as evidenced by all major statements issued by the FASB. Minor statements, amendments, and strictly technical pronouncements were omitted because of their limited exposure to the political process. Our analysis reveals that the SEC applied substantial pressure on the FASB in the standard setting process and has not adopted a position of benign neglect.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Palmon & Marietta Peytcheva & Ari Yezegel, 2011. "The Accounting Standards Setting Process in the U.S.: Examination of the SEC–FASB Relationship," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 165-183, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:20:y:2011:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-009-9166-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-009-9166-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Newman, Dp, 1981. "The Secs Influence On Accounting Standards - The Power Of The Veto," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19, pages 134-156.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary Kleinman & Pamela Strickland & Asokan Anandarajan, 2016. "The Accounting Court: Some Speculations on Why Not?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 845-871, July.
    2. Alon, Anna & Dwyer, Peggy D., 2016. "SEC's acceptance of IFRS-based financial reporting: An examination based in institutional theory," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-16.

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