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Protecting the public or setting the bar too high? Understanding the causes and consequences of regulatory actions of front-line regulators and specialized drug shop operators in Kenya

Author

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  • Wafula, Francis
  • Molyneux, Catherine
  • Mackintosh, Maureen
  • Goodman, Catherine

Abstract

The problem of poor regulatory compliance has been widely reported across private health providers in developing countries. Less known are the underlying reasons for poor compliance, especially with regards to the roles played by front-line regulatory staff, and the regulatory institution as a whole. We designed a qualitative study to address this gap, with the study questions and tools drawing on a conceptual framework informed by theoretical literature on regulation. Data were collected from specialized drug shops (SDSs) in two rural districts in Western Kenya in 2011 through eight focus group discussions, and from regulatory staff from organizations governing the pharmaceutical sector through a total of 24 in-depth interviews.

Suggested Citation

  • Wafula, Francis & Molyneux, Catherine & Mackintosh, Maureen & Goodman, Catherine, 2013. "Protecting the public or setting the bar too high? Understanding the causes and consequences of regulatory actions of front-line regulators and specialized drug shop operators in Kenya," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 220-227.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:97:y:2013:i:c:p:220-227
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.08.020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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