Banking Union: A federal model for the European Union with prompt corrective action
The European Commission has published its proposals for the transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the European Central Bank, under Article 127(6) of the TFEU, providing a comprehensive and courageous ‘first step’ towards a European banking union, the other steps being European deposit insurance and resolution procedures. The Policy Brief proposes a strengthening of the Commission package through the establishment of a truly federal system and the enlargement of its scope of application to the entire Union. The European Banking Authority (EBA) should remain in charge of all secondary rule-making in the domain of banking and supervisory standards should be broadened to include all crisis-management powers under a prompt corrective action system à-la-FDIC in the US.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2012|
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- Carmassi, Jacopo & Micossi, Stefano, 2012. "Time to Set Banking Regulation Right," CEPS Papers 6734, Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund," CEPS Papers 6918, Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1997. "FDICIA after five years: a review and evaluation," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation WP-97-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
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