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Banking Union: A federal model for the European Union with prompt corrective action

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  • Carmassi, Jacopo
  • Di Noia, Carmine
  • Micossi, Stefano

Abstract

The European Commission has published its proposals for the transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the European Central Bank, under Article 127(6) of the TFEU, providing a comprehensive and courageous ‘first step’ towards a European banking union, the other steps being European deposit insurance and resolution procedures. The Policy Brief proposes a strengthening of the Commission package through the establishment of a truly federal system and the enlargement of its scope of application to the entire Union. The European Banking Authority (EBA) should remain in charge of all secondary rule-making in the domain of banking and supervisory standards should be broadened to include all crisis-management powers under a prompt corrective action system à-la-FDIC in the US.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmassi, Jacopo & Di Noia, Carmine & Micossi, Stefano, 2012. "Banking Union: A federal model for the European Union with prompt corrective action," CEPS Papers 7308, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:7308
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    File URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2012/09/PB%20282%20JC%20CdN%20%2526%20SM%20Federal%20Banking%20Union.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    2. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1997. "FDICIA after five years: a review and evaluation," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation WP-97-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    3. Carmassi, Jacopo & Micossi, Stefano, 2012. "Time to Set Banking Regulation Right," CEPS Papers 6734, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    4. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund," CEPS Papers 6918, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    5. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marius Andrei Zoican & Lucyna Anna Gornicka, 2014. "Banking Union Optimal Design under Moral Hazard," 2014 Papers pzo33, Job Market Papers.
    2. Górnicka, Lucyna A. & Zoican, Marius A., 2016. "Too-international-to-fail? Supranational bank resolution and market discipline," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 41-58.
    3. Marius A. Zoican & Lucyna A. Górnicka, 2013. "Banking Unions: Distorted Incentives and Efficient Bank Resolution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-184/VI, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 May 2014.

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