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A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund

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  • Schoenmaker, Dirk
  • Gros, Daniel

Abstract

The eurozone is caught in a ‘diabolical loop’ in which weak domestic banking systems damage sovereign fiscal positions and conversely, in which risky sovereign positions disproportionately threaten domestic banking stability. A European-level banking system could go a long way towards breaking this unfortunate loop and stabilising the eurozone. This would require a European safety net for cross-border banks. This paper sketches the building blocks of a European Deposit Insurance Fund. We calculate that such a Fund would amount to €55 billion for the 35 largest European banks. This Fund could be created over ten years through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on the top 35 banks. Once fully up and running, the Fund could also deal with the resolution of one or more of these 35 banks. The Fund would then be turned into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund. The paper aims to promote debate among policy-makers, industry and academia.

Suggested Citation

  • Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund," CEPS Papers 6918, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:6918
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2012/05/WD364%20DS%20%2526%20DG%20on%20European%20Deposit%20Insurance.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Haan,Jakob & Oosterloo,Sander & Schoenmaker,Dirk, 2012. "Financial Markets and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107635920, November.
    2. Gerhardt, Maria & Lannoo, Karel, 2011. "Options for reforming deposit protection schemes in the EU," ECRI Papers 4339, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    3. Hertig Gerard & Lee Ruben & McCahery Joseph A., 2010. "Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 171-215, January.
    4. Keynote Speech by Maurice Obstfeld, 2011. "International Liquidity: The Fiscal Dimension," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 29, pages 33-48, November.
    5. Schoenmaker, Dirk, 2011. "The financial trilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 57-59, April.
    6. Repullo, Rafael, 2000. "Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 580-605, August.
    7. André Sapir & Benedicta Marzinotto & Guntram Wolff, 2011. "What Kind of Fiscal Union ?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/174293, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, 2009. "Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(1), pages 141-165, March.
    9. Jean Dermine, 2000. "Bank Mergers in Europe: The Public Policy Issues," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 409-425, September.
    10. repec:cup:cbooks:9781107025943 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. María J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, 2006. "Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors' prompt corrective action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the European Union?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marcelo Madureira Prates, 2013. "Why Prudential Regulation Will Fail to Prevent Financial Crises. A Legal Approach," Working Papers Series 335, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    2. Thorsten Beck & Daniel Gros, 2012. "Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination Instead of Separation," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(4), pages 33-39, December.
    3. Carmassi, Jacopo & Di Noia, Carmine & Micossi, Stefano, 2012. "Banking Union: A federal model for the European Union with prompt corrective action," CEPS Papers 7308, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    4. Marius Andrei Zoican & Lucyna Anna Gornicka, 2014. "Banking Union Optimal Design under Moral Hazard," 2014 Papers pzo33, Job Market Papers.
    5. Chen, Shi & Lin, Ku-Jun, 2015. "Technology choice and bank performance with government capital injection under deposit insurance fund protection," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 162-174.
    6. repec:eee:finsta:v:33:y:2017:i:c:p:207-223 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Maylis Avaro & Henri Sterdyniak, 2014. "Banking union: a solution to the euro zone crisis?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 193-241.
    8. Marius A. Zoican & Lucyna A. Górnicka, 2013. "Banking Unions: Distorted Incentives and Efficient Bank Resolution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-184/VI, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 May 2014.
    9. Michael Clauss, 2014. "The dynamics of European banking union: the process of its making and its role in future financial and economic integration," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(4), pages 68-76, January.
    10. Zbyněk Revenda, 2013. "Teoretické a ekonomické aspekty pojištění vkladů
      [Theoretical and Economic Aspects of Deposit Insurance]
      ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2013(2), pages 149-170.
    11. Henrique S. Basso & James Costain, 2016. "Fiscal Delegation in a Monetary Union with Decentralized Public Spending," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 62(2), pages 256-288.
    12. Górnicka, Lucyna A. & Zoican, Marius A., 2016. "Too-international-to-fail? Supranational bank resolution and market discipline," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 41-58.
    13. Iain Begg, 2012. "Banking Union: Inevitable, But Profoundly Challenging?," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(4), pages 15-20, December.
    14. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, 2016. "Banking Union in Historical Perspective: The Initiative of the European Commission in the 1960s–1970s," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 913-927, July.
    15. Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2013. "Granger-causality in peripheral EMU public debt markets: A dynamic approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4627-4649.
    16. Daniel Gros, 2012. "Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System," Credit and Capital Markets, Credit and Capital Markets, vol. 45(4), pages 489-499.
    17. Belke, Ansgar & Dobrzańska, Anna & Gros, Daniel & Smaga, Paweł, 2016. "(When) should a non-euro country join the banking union?," Ruhr Economic Papers 613, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    18. Hans Geeroms & Pawel Karbownik, 2014. "A Monetary Union requires a Banking Union," Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 33, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe.
    19. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update," CEPS Papers 7276, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    20. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/f6h8764enu2lskk9p4srjesb4 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Marek Dabrowski, 2012. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Determinants of the Eurozone Crisis and its Resolution," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 443, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.

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