What Kind of Fiscal Union ?
This policy brief argues that the euro area's shortcomings have become abundantly clear. It was set up without powers of strict surveillance over macroeconomic imbalances, crisis management and resolution instruments, or adequate banking supervision and resolution tools. The authors assert that the core reason for these failures is the absence of a fiscal union with corresponding authority over fiscal, structural and banking policies.
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|Date of creation:||2011|
|Publication status:||Published in: Bruegel Policy Brief (2011) n° 06|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CP135, 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles|
Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be
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