The crisis of euro’s governance: institutional aspects and policy issues
The European Monetary Union is characterized by a crisis of governance, this has become more evident with the crisis of the euro which has shown the weaknesses of the European institutions and stressed the heterogeneity of member countries. The global financial crisis struck the euro area very severely because it coincided with the lack of appropriate policy tools to manage the crisis and with a period of weak political leadership which have made crisis management even harder. Europe needs to build the institutions of its monetary union to avoid similar crises in the future. But it is necessary a greater European integration, with a central fiscal entity at European level which requires a transfer of sovereignty from the individual Member States. This contribution first discusses the issue concerning rules and discretion in the governance of the euro. In the following section it describes the euro crisis and examines the remedies put in place, noting that despite the statements and the efforts of the European authorities the confidence in the euro is diminishing. Thus the exit of Greece from the euro or even the breakdown of the single currency has become a hypothesis discussed more frequently among economists, politicians, central bankers and businessmen. The last section of the work focuses on what’s wrong in the governance of the euro and examines the institutional aspects and the economic policy issues suggesting that the European integration serves to ensure the European citizens independence and protect their historical freedom, but also to influence and thus affect the choices from which may depend the future prosperity of European nations involved.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2011.
"A model of coopetitive games and the Greek crisis,"
32098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model,"
NBER Working Papers
0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2010.
"Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools,"
27138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David CARFÌ & Daniele SCHILIRÒ, 2011. "Crisis In The Euro Area. Coopetitive Game Solutions As New Policy Tools," Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 23-36, June.
- Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2010. "Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools," MPRA Paper 31891, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jun 2011.
- Benedicta Marzinotto & AndrÃ© Sapir & Guntram B. Wolff, 2011.
"What kind of fiscal union?,"
- AndrÃ© Sapir & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Zsolt Darvas, 2011.
"A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis,"
- André Sapir, 2011. "A Comprehensive Approach to the Euro-Area Debt Crisis," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/174297, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Zsolt Darvas & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Andre Sapir, 2011. "A Comprehensive Approach to the Euro-Area Debt Crisis," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1110, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Zsolt Darvas & Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir, 2011. "A Comprehensive Approach to the Euro-Area Debt Crisis," Working Papers 1101, Department of Mathematical Economics and Economic Analysis, Corvinus University of Budapest.
- Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2011.
"Target Loans, Current Account Balances and Capital Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facility,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3500, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 468-508, August.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner & Wollmershäuser, Timo, 2012. "Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: The ECB’s rescue facility," Munich Reprints in Economics 19556, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershaeuser, 2011. "Target Loans, Current Account Balances and Capital Flows: The ECB's Rescue Facility," NBER Working Papers 17626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988.
"Voting on the Budget Deficit,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," Scholarly Articles 4553030, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," NBER Working Papers 2759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guido Tabellini & Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," UCLA Economics Working Papers 539, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Schilirò, Daniele, 2005.
"Economia della conoscenza,istituzioni e sviluppo economico
[Knowledge-based economy, institutions and economic development]," MPRA Paper 31492, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Daniele Schilirò, 2008. "Investing in Knowledge: Knowledge, Human Capital and Institutions for the Long Run Growth," CRANEC - Working Papers del Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale crn0804, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale (CRANEC).
- von Hagen, Jurgen & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 134-38, May.
- Martin S. Feldstein, 2011. "The Euro and European Economic Conditions," NBER Working Papers 17617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Feldstein, Martin S., 2011. "The Euro and European Economic Conditions," Scholarly Articles 9949289, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- N. Holinski & C.J.M. Kool & J. Muysken, 2010.
"Origins of persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area,"
10-12, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Holinski Nils & Kool Clemens & Muysken Joan, 2010. "Origins of persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Schilirò, Daniele, 2006.
"L’euro, il patto di stabilità e di crescita e la sua riforma
[The euro, the stability and growth pact and its reform]," MPRA Paper 37333, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marco Buti & Jo�o Nogueira Martins & Alessandro Turrini, 2007.
"From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules,"
CESifo Economic Studies,
CESifo, vol. 53(1), pages 115-152, March.
- Buti, Marco & Martins, Joao Nogueira & Turrini, Alessandro Antonio, 2006. "From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 5809, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schilirò, Daniele & Carfì, David, 2012. "A framework of coopetitive games:applications to the Greek crisis," MPRA Paper 37855, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Krogstrup, Signe & Wyplosz, Charles, 2010. "A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 269-278, February.
- Daniele Schilirò, 2010. "Jean Pisani-Ferry and Adam S. Posen. 2009. The Euro at Ten: The next global currency? (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, Bruegel)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 101-105, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40861. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.