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A new governance for EMU and the economic policy framework

  • Schilirò, Daniele

The severe crisis affecting European Monetary Union has emphasized the prevailing interests of national governments and the lack of political leadership of European institutions, not to mention the failure of eurozone governance in terms of effective crisis management. The present work argues that the decisions taken in March 2011 by the European Council, namely the ‘Pact for the Euro’, to design the new governance of European Monetary Union (EMU), can be considered a necessary though insufficient step for European institutions in terms of credibility and legitimacy. By assessing the economic policy framework set up by the Pact for the Euro, this contribution underlines the need for appropriate institutions, and a stronger attitude of cooperation among Member States. It also stresses the need for transparency and a non-ambiguous solution to the debt crisis. The major message of this work is that Economic and Monetary Union must equip itself with the appropriate policy tools to manage and resolve the crisis, creating the conditions to improve the competitiveness of the peripheral countries of the eurozone and fostering growth. At the same time, however, eurozone member states and European institutions must demonstrate greater accountability and political coherence.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 47454.

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Date of creation: Apr 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:47454
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  1. David CARFÌ & Daniele SCHILIRÒ, 2011. "Crisis In The Euro Area. Coopetitive Game Solutions As New Policy Tools," Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 23-36, June.
  2. von Hagen, Jurgen & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 134-38, May.
  3. Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2011. "A model of coopetitive games and the Greek crisis," MPRA Paper 32098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Zsolt Darvas & Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir, 2011. "A Comprehensive Approach to the Euro-Area Debt Crisis," Working Papers 1101, Department of Mathematical Economics and Economic Analysis, Corvinus University of Budapest.
  5. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna & Vincenzo Galasso, 2011. "The Euro and Structural Reforms," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 2(1).
  6. Prodi Romano, 2010. "Is the Greek Crisis also Becoming a Crisis of the EMU?," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 227-236.
  7. Jean Pisani-Ferry & Adam Posen, . "The euro at ten: the next global currency?," Books, Bruegel, number 303, March.
  8. Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2010. "Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools," MPRA Paper 27138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. N. Holinski & C.J.M. Kool & J. Muysken, 2010. "Origins of persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area," Working Papers 10-12, Utrecht School of Economics.
  10. Daniele Schilirò, 2008. "Investing in Knowledge: Knowledge, Human Capital and Institutions for the Long Run Growth," CRANEC - Working Papers del Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale crn0804, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale (CRANEC).
  11. Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2010. "Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools," MPRA Paper 31891, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jun 2011.
  12. David Carf\'i & Daniele Schilir\'o, 2011. "A model of coopetitive game and the Greek crisis," Papers 1106.3543, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2011.
  13. Missale, Alessandro, 1999. "Public Debt Management," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198290858, March.
  14. Schilirò, Daniele, 2006. "L’euro, il patto di stabilità e di crescita e la sua riforma
    [The euro, the stability and growth pact and its reform]
    ," MPRA Paper 37333, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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