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Reinforcing EU Governance in Times of Crisis: The Commission Proposals and Beyond

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  • Belke, Ansgar

Abstract

The recent extensive package introduced by the Commission is the most comprehensive reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area since the launch of the Economic and Monetary Union. Broader and enhanced surveillance of fiscal policies, but also macroeconomic policies and structural reforms are sought in the light of the shortcomings of the existing legislation. New enforcement mechanisms are foreseen for non-compliant Member States. In this very crucial and important package of 6 legislative dossiers this paper tries to identify critical missing or redundant and/or unworkable elements within the Commission package. Moreover, it checks what (if anything) is missing outside and beyond the proposals in order to make the whole package of governance reform complete and workable as, for instance, crisis resolution mechanisms and debt restructuring, EMF, project bonds and Eurobonds.

Suggested Citation

  • Belke, Ansgar, 2010. "Reinforcing EU Governance in Times of Crisis: The Commission Proposals and Beyond," Ruhr Economic Papers 232, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:232
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holger Zemanek & Ansgar Belke & Gunther Schnabl, 2010. "Current account balances and structural adjustment in the euro area," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 83-127, May.
    2. Raffer, Kunibert, 1990. "Applying chapter 9 insolvency to international debts: An economically efficient solution with a human face," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-311, February.
    3. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2004. "Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 247-264, April.
    4. Jürgen von Hagen & Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir & Francois Gianviti & Anne O. Krueger, . "A European mechanism for sovereign debt crisis resolution- a proposal," Blueprints, Bruegel, number 446, December.
    5. repec:zbw:rwirep:0176 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Michael Bradley & James D. Cox & Mitu Gulati, 2010. "The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 289-324, January.
    7. Ansgar Belke, 2010. "The Euro Area Crisis Management Framework: Consequences and Institutional Follow-Ups," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1076, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Alberto Alesina & Francesco Giavazzi, 2010. "Europe and the Euro," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number ales08-1, March.
    9. Spaventa, Luigi & Giavazzi, Francesco, 2010. "Why the current account may matter in a monetary union: Lessons from the financial crisis in the Euro area," CEPR Discussion Papers 8008, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schilirò, Daniele, 2011. "A new governance for the EMU and the economic policy framework," MPRA Paper 32235, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2011.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU governance; European Council; European Financial Stability Facility; European Monetary Fund; policy coordination; scoreboard; Stability and Growth Pact;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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