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Governance and institutions for stability and growth in the Eurozone


  • Schiliro, Daniele


The present paper aims to contribute to the debate on what kind of governance and institutions are needed to ensure stability and growth in the Eurozone. In fact, despite the economic recovery, the Eurozone does not yet have effective institutions to ensure stability in the face of a new economic crisis, without forgetting legitimacy, transparency, and ability to meet the expectations of greater prosperity for euro area citizens. This paper intends to support the view of a deep rethinking of EMU with a different governance and different institutions. The new governance should imply a renewed political agreement among the member states not only of the Eurozone, but also of the whole European Union. This political agreement must lead to a reconsideration of the Maastricht parameters, to a different approach of the European institutions and, lastly, to the change of the EU Treaty. The paper will also discuss the role of institutions that must balance the European interests and those of member states with the aim to provide a consistent approach to stability and growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Schiliro, Daniele, 2017. "Governance and institutions for stability and growth in the Eurozone," MPRA Paper 95428, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:95428

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Daniele Schiliro, 2014. "Changes in Eurozone Governance after the Crisis and the Issue of Growth," International Journal of Social Science Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 2(2), pages 110-119, April.
    2. Jean Pisani-Ferry, 2012. "The Euro crisis and the new impossible trinity," Policy Contributions 674, Bruegel.
    3. Luc Eyraud & Vitor Gaspar & Tigran Poghosyan, 2017. "Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area," IMF Working Papers 17/18, International Monetary Fund.
    4. von Hagen, Jurgen & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 134-138, May.
    5. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 2016. "Minimal Conditions for the Survival of the Euro," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 51(1), pages 24-28, January.
    6. Manuel Sanchis i Marco, 2014. "The Economics of the Monetary Union and the Eurozone Crisis," SpringerBriefs in Economics, Springer, edition 127, number 978-3-319-00020-6, February.
    7. Schilirò, Daniele, 2011. "A new governance for the EMU and the economic policy framework," MPRA Paper 32235, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2011.
    8. Nicolas Véron & Guntram B. Wolff, 2016. "Capital Markets Union: A Vision for the Long Term," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 130-153.
    9. Mario Tonveronachi, 2014. "The ECB and the Single European Financial Market: A Proposal to Repair Half of a Flawed Design," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive ppb_137, Levy Economics Institute.
    10. Alcidi, Cinzia & Giovannini, Alessandro & Piedrafita, Sonia, 2014. "Enhancing the Legitimacy of EMU Governance," CEPS Papers 9914, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    11. Gros, Daniel & Busse, Matthias, 2013. "The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and Germany: When is a surplus an “imbalance”?," CEPS Papers 8593, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    12. Herman Rompuy, 2017. "Europe means more than just crisis," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(1), pages 1-10, April.
    13. Schilirò, Daniele, 2016. "Rules, Imbalances and Growth in the Eurozone," MPRA Paper 75641, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    More about this item


    European Commission; ECB; rules-based system; economic convergence; banking union; financial stability; growth-oriented policies; transparency; legitimacy; treaty changes;

    JEL classification:

    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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